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Book Reviews

mon explanation) commit the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. That is,
in arguing that A (ritual) causes B (anxiety reduction), one may not simply demonstrate the presence of B in the society under study. Any number of things
could account for B. Theories that avoid this difficulty by adding that A or it
equivalent causes B also fail to explain A and tend toward triviality.
The resolution to these theoretical dead ends is, for Penner, structuralism.
Penner's chapters on the thought of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, and on
the relation of Saussure to the thought of Claude Levi-Strauss, are the best introduction to structuralism I am aware of. As evidence for the success of
structuralism, Penner quickly reviews the progress made by Levi-Strauss on the
intractable anthropological problems of kinship, totemism, and myth.
In his final chapter Penner shows how the rigorous adoption of structuralism

as a method in the history of religions has borne fruit. Here he cites Louis

Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus (English trans., Chicago, 1980) and S. J. Tambiah's
account of Buddhism. These are certainly formidable players to have on one's

side. Penner's own attempt at applying structuralism to a cycle of myths from the
Shiva Purana (dates unknown) is less impressive and might easily have been left
out. His structural grid is derived from categories external to the myth in question (he borrows some categories from Levi-Strauss's analysis of the Oedipus
myth). This grid serves to do little more than organize the complex terms of the
myth cycle.
Of course, there are positive arguments for structuralism, as well as "the last
theory left standing" argument. There is a growing sentiment in the academy
that all the human sciences must fundamentally be grounded on the analysis of
language. One wishes that Penner, with his facility with theory, had presented

this positive argument. Once this argument is made, it becomes clear that

structuralism may not be the only player left standing. Dan Sperber, for example
(Rethinking Symbolism [English trans., New York, 1975]), as well as E. Thomas
Lawson and Robert N. McCauley (Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and

Culture [New York, 1990], a book published soon after Penner's, but which

Penner saw in manuscript) believe indeed that structuralism is an advance but
that it is itself surpassed by "cognitive" approaches. These cognitive approaches
take their bearings from linguistics, as does structuralism, but it is a linguistics
along the lines of Noam Chomsky rather than Saussure or Roman Jakobson.
But it quickly becomes ludicrous to wish that an author do something more or
something different. This should in no way take away from what Penner has in

fact achieved. All scholars of religions and teachers of religious studies owe
Penner a debt of gratitude for gathering into one place powerful critiques of
some of the most popular approaches to the study of religion.
THEODORE M. VIAL, Chicago, Illinois.

GODLOVE, TERRY F., JR. Religion, Interpretation and Diversity of Belief" The Framework Model from Kant to Durkheim to Davidson. New York: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 1989. xii+207 pp.

While many in the "analytic" tradition in philosophy of religion continue to pursue issues inherited from natural theology, a set of questions of interest primarily
to proponents of the theistic theological traditions and their adversaries, a loose
countertradition exists that draws on the analytic tradition in metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language but brings that work to bear on broadly
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methodological questions. Instead of the classical debates on God's existence and
the logic of the divine properties, it tends to focus on relativism and rationality,
explanation and understanding, and hermeneutical issues in the interpretation
of religion. Terry Godlove belongs in this second group. He moves skillfully
from Kant to Durkheim to Donald Davidson in attempting to show that, when
"Kant's a priori, selbstgedachte categories became components of human conceptual frameworks, open to empirical investigation" (p. 63), Durkheim fathered,
despite himself, the idea of religion as a conceptual scheme imposed somehow on
a neutral experiential base, thereby generating the contemporary debate over
relativism. Davidson's assault on conceptual schemes recaptures the genuinely
Kantian insight that our first-person claims are transcendentally constrained by a
world of space and time we share with others. Religions embody narratives that
provide an interpretive base for individual and corporate self-understanding. As
such they are highly theoretical and likely to generate controversy when confronted by competitors from other intellectual or cultural traditions.
Students of Kant may worry that Godlove's identification with Davidson is a bit
too facile, while social scientists may suspect him of preempting any critical interpretation of religion. If E. Durkheim, C. Geertz, M. Eliade, and Robin Horton all
employ the "framework model," perhaps it is just too vague to worry about. But
the book has its principal impact on the debate between "pragmatists," here represented by Jeffrey Stout (p. 153), and those who maintain that religious "narra-

tives depend for their meaningfulness and objectivity on a transcendental

counterpart" (p. 150). Pragmatists, be they believers or nonbelievers, tend to
think that if beliefs are true they need no further analysis, and if they are in
doubt we should defer to the best available history, sociology, and anthropology.
What work does Godlove's "transcendental counterpart" perform? The truth of
"I have offended God by my vile acts" depends on no transcendental argument or
metanarrative but on my having offended God by my vile acts. Why should explicating religion require invoking anything more than beliefs, practices, and institutions? If the "only interpretive limit on the possible scope of religious belief is
the requirement that all religious belief systems have enough in common that all

are identifiably religious" (p. 145), Godlove excludes nothing that satisfies
Davidson's constraints on learnable languages. Stout may be persuaded that

Kant is not the founder of relativism without finding any purpose to being

Kantian.

Nonetheless, Godlove clarifies the argument between methodological pragm
tists and those transcendentalists who fear that historical or social scientifi
accounts of religion risk reducing it to something it is not. Godlove's is a ch
lenging and important contribution.
SCOTT DAVIS, University of Southern California.

SCHLATTER, GERHARD. Mythos: Streifziige durch Tradition und Gegenwart. Mun

Trickster Verlag, 1989. 237 pp. DM 36.00.

"Myth without Pain" could be the title of this short book in German, which tr
to explain at graduate level while keeping up some fun and excitement the ma
theories on myth and ritual together with anthropological data on which th
ries are based. The enterprise is desperate, but Gerhard Schlatter succeeds fair
well in presenting the main nineteenth- and twentieth-century trends in my
interpretations, although soon all excitement is gone, for many theories are
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